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Abstract
This paper presents a model in which final goods producers outsource intermediate input
production. Intermediate inputs are differentiated and their production can be located at home
or abroad. The model is used to examine competitive location policy in a (two-country) free
trade agreement (FTA). It is shown that national public infrastructure investment has a
positive effect on both the number of intermediate input producers and the return to the
immobile factor in the home country. International outsourcing from home declines. Opposite
effects are triggered in the partner country. In a welfare analysis we characterize national
infrastructure policies that aim to maximize national income (net of tax costs) and compare
the non-cooperative FTA-equilibrium with optimal policies from an integrated point of view.
It is shown when coordination of competitive location policies is useful and when it is not.
JEL Code: F12, F15, F42, H54.















We are grateful to Peter Egger, Michael Pfaffermayr and Herbert Walther for helpful
comments and suggestions. We have also benefited from discussion at the European Trade
Study Group Meeting 2002 and the Passauer Workshop on International Economics 2003 as
well as from discussion at the University of Linz Economics Department Research Seminar
2002.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Location has become a key issue in the political debate on the macroeconomic conse-
quences of the recent wave of globalization. In the past, production of manufacturing
goods was to a large extent integrated within a single ￿rm so that a location change was
an exceptional phenomenon. It meant that a wide range of diﬀerent production stages
had to be shifted from one place to another. However, technical progress in recent years
has tremendously changed the production process. Increased fragmentability and lower
costs for service links make production and assembling of diﬀerent parts of the value
added chain at diﬀerent locations feasible and pro￿table (see Jones, 2000; and Jones and
Kierzkowski, 2001). Therefore, modern industrial production is characterized by a high
degree of vertical fragmentation and international outsourcing.1 This implies that the
optimal location is chosen for individual production stages, and specialized intermediate
input producers make use of competitive location advantages all over the world. Despite
this salient feature of reality, a macroeconomic model that accounts for the relationship
between international outsourcing and the location of intermediate input suppliers is so
far missing in the literature. To close this gap is the purpose of our paper. It provides
a simultaneous explanation of the location of intermediate input suppliers, the volume of
international outsourcing and the returns to immobile production factors as a function of
the economic fundamentals and of national public infrastructure provision which is used
as a mean of competitive location policy.2
The literature on international outsourcing has so far predominantly built on tradi-
1Hummels et al. (2001) ￿nd for a sample of 14 economies (10 OECD memebers and four emerging
markets countries) that the vertical specialization (i.e., international outsourcing) share of exports grew
by about 30% over the period of 1970-1990 and that growth in vertical specialization accounted for 30% of
the growth in the overall export/GDP ratio. See also Feenstra (1998) and Feenstra and Hanson (2001)f o r
a discussion on the relvance of vertical fragmentation and international outsourcing in modern industrial
production.
2"A competitive location policy is a comprehensive policy ... that includes all aspects that de￿ne the
attractiveness of a location." (Brakman et al., 2002, p. 2; in translation of Dutch Ministry of Economic
Aﬀairs, 1999, p. 114f . )
2tional trade models of the Heckscher-Ohlin, Ricardo and Ricardo-Viner type. In these
models, perfect competition characterizes ￿n a la sw e l la si n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d sm a r k e t s
so that the location of intermediate input producers is undetermined. See for instance
Arndt, 1997; Deardorﬀ,2 0 0 1; Egger, 2002; Egger and Falkinger, 2002; Jones, 2000; Jones
and Kierzkowski, 2001.3 Recently, a few studies have addressed the relationship be-
tween industry structure and international outsourcing. However, they primarily focus
on imperfect competition in the ￿nal goods market and do not deal with the location
of intermediate input producers and its relation to international outsourcing decisions of
￿nal goods suppliers. See Burda and Dluhosch, 2001, 2002.
The literature on multinational ￿rms includes locational aspects (see for instance
Markusen, 2002; Markusen and Venables, 2000). However, this literature focuses on
intra-￿rm trade, whereas in our analysis outsourced components are purchased through
arm￿s length transactions in (imperfect) markets.4 Moreover, in the theory of multina-
tional ￿rms both the decision on setting up a production plant abroad and the decision
on intra-￿rm trade are simultaneously made by a multinational￿s headquarters. In our
analysis of international outsourcing the intermediate input suppliers decide on the loca-
tion of intermediate goods production and the ￿nal goods producers decide on the volume
of international outsourcing. Firm location also plays an important role in the literature
on economic geography (see for instance Krugman, 1991; Baldwin and Krugman, 2002;
Krugman and Venables, 1995). However, the focus again lies on ￿nal goods production.
Vertical fragmentation and international outsourcing are not considered.
The idea that ￿rms are located at some place implies that there are ￿xed costs which
3Kohler (2001) accounts for ￿xed network costs that are entailed by international outsourcing.
4Recently, several studies have analyzed a multinational￿s decision to enter a foreign market through
foreign direct investment and subsidiary production or through international outsourcing and arm￿s length
transaction. This decision is based on a trade oﬀ between higher production costs in the case of foreign
direct investment and the costs that arise from contractual imperfections in the case of arm￿s length
transactions. (See e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2002a, 2002b; and Markusen, 2002.) Such a decision
problem is not considered in our paper. We focus on market transactions. Bilateral relations based on
contractual arrangements are not considered.
3are invested at a certain location and not at another. Therefore, we consider imperfect
competition in the intermediate goods market. Imperfections in the ￿nal goods market
are ignored. Moreover, our model emphasizes the importance of public infrastructure
investment for a country￿s attractiveness as a location for intermediate input production.
There is broad consensus among economists and politicians that public infrastructure
investment is an important aspect of a competitive location policy. EU members, for
example, agreed upon a benchmark method to determine the competitiveness of the EU
economies. Among 54 indicators that are used for the assessment, social and economic
infrastructure plays a prominent role (see Brakman et al., 2002). And the Portland
Development Commission (2002) states that "an important role of government is to in-
crease economic capacity by improving quality and eﬃciency of public infrastructure and
utilities necessary to business operation" (p. 7). In the context of vertical fragmentation,
governments can use public infrastructure provision as a policy instrument to attract a
higher number of intermediate input producers and therefore to reduce the volume of a
country￿s component imports from abroad.
We set up a general equilibrium model with one ￿nal good and diﬀerentiated inter-
mediate inputs. Production in the ￿nal goods sector employs internationally immobile
low-skilled labor for assembling the outsourced (diﬀerentiated) intermediate inputs. They
are supplied under monopolistic competition. Final goods markets as well as factor mar-
kets are competitive. Intermediate input production makes use of internationally mobile
capital. We assume that two small industrialized economies characterized by identical
production technologies and equal endowments form a free trade agreement (). En-
dowments consist of immobile labor and mobile capital that is owned by residents of the
respective country. Intermediate input suppliers can decide about their location within
the , thereby taking into account the attractiveness of the two member coun-
tries for intermediate input production. This attractiveness depends on the ￿xed costs
requirements for setting up a ￿rm. Governments can in￿uence the location choice of inter-
mediate input suppliers through national infrastructure policy. Higher public infrastruc-
ture investment reduces ￿x e dc o s t st os e tu pap l a n ti nt h i se c o n o m ya n dt h e r e f o r er a i s e s
4the attractiveness of a country. (See for a similar assumption Bougheas et al., 2000.)5
After introducing the basic framework in Section 2 and solving the -equilibrium
in Section 3, Section 4 provides a comparative-static analysis about the eﬀects of public
infrastructure investment on ￿rm location, international outsourcing and wages. In Sec-
tion 5 we analyze the role of public infrastructure investment as a competitive location
policy instrument that is ￿nanced by lump-sum taxes. In addition, we investigate the
role of policy coordination. In Section 6 we discuss the robustness of our ￿ndings, some
considerations on wage dispersion in the and a diﬀerent interpretation of our results.
The last section concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We consider economies with a single ￿nal good  (the numØraire good) and two primary
production factors: internationally immobile (low-skilled) labor  and internationally
mobile , which may be interpreted as capital or know-how. Primary factors are not
directly transformed into the ￿nal good, there is also intermediate goods production.
Production of ￿nal output makes use of diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs  and primary
input . The production of diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs is outsourced by the ￿nal
goods producers and purchased through arm￿s length transactions from (anonymous)
intermediate input suppliers. Low-skilled labor requirements  may be associated with
business service activities that are essential in the assembling process. The production













Following Ethier (1982) we assume that the contribution of intermediate inputs  can
be aggregated by a CES-index. For the production of diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs
5Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) use a more general approach that allows public infrastructure in-
vestment to aﬀect both variable and ￿xed costs of intermediate input production. Other studies, like
Bougheas et al. (1999), assume that public infrastructure investment reduces transport costs. Such an
eﬀect is not considered in our model.
5employment of  is essential. For the purpose of simplicity and in order to keep the
analysis tractable, we assume that the production of diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs
does not require employment of factor .6 The production technology in the -sector is
identical for all ￿rms and given by
 =  (2)
We follow the common approach that monopolistic competition characterizes the mar-
ket for the diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs . The number of intermediate inputs is
determined by the zero-pro￿tc o n d i t i o n .
3 Equilibrium under a Free Trade Agreement
Let  and  be two industrialized economies characterized by identical production tech-
nologies and identical endowment  of the immobile factor. Moreover, an equal amount 
units of the internationally mobile factor is owned by residents of  and , respectively.
The two economies form a free trade agreement ()s ot h a tt h e r ea r en ot a r i ﬀ barriers
on intermediate input and ￿nal goods trade between  and . In addition, we assume
that commodity  is freely traded between the  and the rest of the world (RoW),
whereas there is no trade of intermediate inputs outside the .7 Finally, we assume
that both countries  and  are small economies. Then, perfect mobility of factor 
implies that its factor return, , is determined in the world market outside the .8 The
6See Ludema and Wooton (2000) for a similar assumption regarding the type of factor inputs in the
production of sophisticated goods.
7There are several reasons why intermediate inputs cannot be traded between the and the RoW.
First, trading costs between the  and the RoW may be prohibitive for sophisticated intermediate
inputs. Second, there may be a complex set of rules of origin, which prohibits use of intermediate inputs
from outside the world. For a discussion on the negative eﬀects of rules of origins in the presence of
a  see Baldwin (2001)a n dL l o y d( 2 0 0 1). Finally, the RoW may employ an integrated production
technology for commodity  , so that there is neither supply of nor demand for sophisticated intermediate
inputs in the RoW.
8This assumption re￿ects the idea that capital cannot be taxed by local governments given its high
degree of international mobility.
6price, , for the immobile factor depends on its location  = 	. It is determined by
the condition that labor earns its marginal product and full-employment  =  prevails
in equilibrium. Thus, according to (1)




where   is the equilibrium level of ￿nal output in country  = 	.D e n o t eb y

(
	) the free on board (fob) prices of the intermediate component 
 (
	)p r o d u c e d
by intermediate input supplier  () located in country  (, respectively) and used by
a ￿nal goods producer located in market  = 	. The free trade agreement allows the
￿rms in the ￿nal goods sector to choose freely between intermediate inputs regardless of
their origin. Optimal demand of 
 (
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 = 	, are the demand functions relevant for an -producer located in country  and
an 	-producer located in country , respectively. This gives us for the maximization

































,  = 	, is exogenous to the single producer. Note that,
according to (2), marginal production costs of intermediate goods are equal to factor price








 =  .M o r e o v e r ,
solve (4a) and (4b) for 
 and 





7 of internationally mobile  which is determined in the world market. 0 are unit trade
costs (but not tariﬀs) for international -transactions, equivalent for both economies. 
are country-speci￿c ￿xed costs. They depend on the country￿s infrastructure and re￿ect
the attractiveness of a location for intermediate goods production and thus employment


























	 −  (6)
Within each market intermediate input producers are symmetric. Solving (5) and
(6) we obtain a system of four ￿rst-order conditions for intermediate goods producers.
Together with the two zero pro￿t conditions of intermediate input producers and the six
conditions in (3) and (4), describing the ￿nal goods sector in countries  and 	 we have





and 	= 	 as functions of the fundamentals of the two economies. In particular,
the outcome depends on ￿xed costs  which are aﬀected by public infrastructure policy.
This will allow us to do comparative-static analysis of policy eﬀects (see Section 4).
Equilibrium prices, quantities and numbers of intermediate input producers implied by






























































with  6= 0 ∈ {	}. Combining these equations with (1) and (3), we get equilibrium










1− and  :=
(1−)
−  1 are constants
depending on ,  and technology parameters. For a formal derivation see Appendix A.1.
The -equilibrium was derived under the assumption of interior solutions (i.e.,
  0, 
  0, 
  0,  = 	). According to (8) and (9), the following conditions








































Roughly spoken, the two conditions are ful￿lled if ￿xed costs  and  are not too
diﬀerent. In the symmetric case, i.e. if  = , both conditions (10) and (11)a r e
satis￿ed for any 0.
4 Public Infrastructure Expenditures, Firm Location,
International Outsourcing and Wages
In this section we provide a positive analysis on how public infrastructure expenditures af-
fect the location of intermediate input producers, the amount of international outsourcing
and wages in the two economies. As mentioned in the introduction we follow Bougheas
et al. (2000) and assume that public infrastructure only has an impact on ￿xed costs .
An increase of public infrastructure investment in country  reduces ￿xed costs  and
therefore increases the attractiveness of country  as a location of intermediate input
production. Fixed costs in country  are not aﬀected.10 Of course, there is an indirect
eﬀect of infrastructure expenditures on the productivity of ￿nal goods production, due to
a change in number, size and location of intermediate input suppliers.11 This results in
wage adjustments in the two economies, as will be explained in detail below.
We assume that there are two types of ￿xed costs: (i) ￿xed costs 
 that are re-
duced/replaced by public infrastructure investment and (ii) ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed costs 0

10The results of our analysis are also obtained under suﬃciently small spillover eﬀects.
11Such an indirect eﬀect is also emphasized in Holtz-Eakin and Lovely￿s (1996) analysis of the role of
public infrastructure.
9that are independent of public infrastructure investment.12 Examples for the ￿rst type
of ￿xed costs are connection facilities to outside world (e.g. internet). An example for
the second type would be establishment of the intra-￿rm information and communica-


















 represents the quality of public infrastructure investment. 
 () is a negatively
sloped function in interval  ∈ [0	 max
 [,w i t h
 (0)  0 and 
 (max
 )=0 .T h e
bene￿t from investment into public infrastructure reaches a maximum at  = max
 .
Public investment above this level cannot increase the attractiveness of a country for
intermediate input production, since ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed costs 0
  0 are independent of
the quality of public infrastructure. It is assumed that 0
 and 
 are restricted in such
aw a yt h a t( 10) and (11)a r es a t i s ￿ed for all possible combinations of  ∈ [0	 max
 ] and
0 ∈ [0	 max
0 ] and interior solutions result with positive supply of intermediate inputs in
both economies (i.e.,   0, 
  0, 
  0,  = 	).
In the following comparative-static analysis, we consider variations of infrastructure
parameter  in country  and hold ￿xed costs in country  at 1
 =  () constant.
Proposition 1 summarizes the eﬀects of public infrastructure investment on number and
location of intermediate input suppliers.
Proposition 1 A -induced decline of ￿xed costs  has a positive eﬀect on the number
of intermediate input suppliers in country  and a negative eﬀect in country .T h e
impact on the total number of intermediate input suppliers is ambiguous.  () ≤ 1

guarantees a positive impact.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
12In contrast to a pure subsidy for founding a new ￿rm, infrastructure investment has a public good
character.
10For any given  ∈ [0	 max
 [, an increase in infrastructure quality  implies that
￿xed costs decline in country  and  becomes a more attractive location for intermediate
input production. This has two eﬀects. First, the -induced decline of ￿xed costs in
country  leads ceteris paribus to entry of additional ￿rms and therefore to a rise in the
number of intermediate input suppliers located in country . Second, for constant ￿xed
costs in country , there is also a shift of intermediate input producers from country 
to country . As a consequence the number of intermediate input producers increases in
country  and declines in country .T h ee ﬀect on the overall number of intermediate
input producers is positive if ￿xed costs in country  are not higher than in country
, but is ambiguous in general. If  ()  1
 a marginal decline of ￿xed costs in
country  induces a shift of ￿rms from low-￿xed costs country  to high-￿xed costs
country , which tends to lower the equilibrium number of ￿rms. If this negative "shift
eﬀect" dominates the positive "new entry" eﬀect, the total number of intermediate input
producers declines in response to a -induced reduction of ￿xed costs .
Next we consider the impact of public infrastructure investment on international out-
sourcing from the two economies. We are interested in both the volume of international
outsourcing, i.e. 0








, which is a measure for the openness of country  with respect to interme-
diate goods imports.13 The impacts of public infrastructure investment on international
outsourcing are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 A -induced decline of ￿xed costs  leads to a decline in the volume
of country ￿s international outsourcing, i.e., a reduction of 
 , and an increase in
t h ev o l u m eo fc o u n t r y￿s international outsourcing, i.e., an increase of 
.T h e
13In the literature international outsourcing intensity is often measured as intermediate goods imports
relative to gross production. However, a change in this measure comprises several eﬀects, namely, (i)
a change in the resource requirements per output, (ii) changes in overall (national and international)
outsourcing, maybe due to technological changes in the ￿nal goods production, and (iii) variations in
international relative to national outsourcing. Since we are interested in the foreign impact only, we










is the better measure.
11international outsourcing intensity decreases in country  and increases in country .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
For any given  ∈ [0	 max
 [, a higher quality of public infrastructure in country 
induces at the same time a rise in the number  of intermediate good varieties produced
in country  a n dad e c l i n ei nt h en u m b e r of varieties produced in  (see Proposition
1). In addition, there is an output eﬀect. Lower ￿xed costs in country  makes ￿rm
entry easier. Thus, more varieties compete for use by the ￿nal goods producers. This
drives down demand per intermediate component in country , i.e., 
 and 
 decline.14
In sum, intermediate goods imports of country , i.e., 
 , are reduced. The opposite
happens in country , where the decline in the number of locally produced varieties leads
to higher demand per intermediate input, i.e., both 
 and 
 increase, so that country
￿s international outsourcing 
 is stimulated.







both overall local production

 and overall import of intermediate inputs 
 are relevant. Whereas an increase
in public infrastructure investment unambiguously leads to a reduction of intermediate
goods imports 
 ,t h e r ea r et w oo p p o s i n ge ﬀects on the overall level of local production
in country . The number of varieties produced in country  increases (Proposition 1),
but output of an individual ￿rm (
) declines (see discussion above). As proved in
the appendix, the ￿rst eﬀect dominates and overall local production 
 turns out
to be positively related to public infrastructure investments in country . International
outsourcing intensity  therefore declines if the quality of public infrastructure in country
 is improved. That means, intermediate goods imports are replaced by local production
in country .T h eo p p o s i t e￿nding holds for the international outsourcing intensity .
Finally, policy is interested in the eﬀects of infrastructure quality on wages. (Note
that the earnings of capital owners are determined in the world market.) At this stage
of our analysis we cannot address net wage eﬀects, since the question of how public
14Note that, according to (8), 
 and 
 vary proportionally since relative prices are ￿xed by ,  and
.
12infrastructure investment is ￿nanced has not been considered so far. The tax burden of
public infrastructure investment is taken into account in Section 5.
A c c o r d i n gt o( 1) and (3), marginal productivity of  and thus the wage rate depend
on the CES-aggregator  of intermediate components. As a consequence, wages critically
depend on how many intermediate input suppliers are located in  and , respectively,
and on the volume of intermediate inputs purchased from ￿rms at the two locations. The
following proposition summarizes the wage eﬀects resulting when public infrastructure
policy changes the attractiveness of location .
Proposition 3 A -induced decline of ￿xed costs  leads to higher wages in country
 and lower wages in country .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
A decline of ￿xed costs  implies that the number of intermediate input suppliers
in  increases. This dominates the negative size eﬀect so that total home production
of intermediate good suppliers located in country ,i . e . ,
, increases. At the same
time, there is a negative eﬀect on outsourcing to  implying that 
 is reduced.
We ￿nd that the positive eﬀect on marginal labor productivity of the increase in home-
based intermediate goods production 
 dominates the negative eﬀect of the decline
in 
 . Thus, the return to immobile labor in country  increases. The opposite
holds for country .I ns u m ,w e￿nd that public infrastructure investment by increasing
the attractiveness of a country as a location for intermediate input production reduces
international outsourcing of that country and has a positive impact on wages. However,
t h e r ea r en e g a t i v ee ﬀects of public infrastructure investments in the partner country.
These negative eﬀects lead to a decline in the number of local intermediate input producers
in country , which cannot be oﬀset by larger intermediate goods imports, so that wages
in country  are negatively aﬀected by higher infrastructure investment in country .
In Section 5 we extend the positive analysis presented in this section and investigate
the role of public infrastructure expenditures as a policy strategy. Thereby, we assume
that total income of residents, net of the tax burden of public infrastructure investment,
13is the objective of the government.
5 Public Infrastructure Investment as a Competitive
Location Policy
By providing a certain level of infrastructure quality governments can in￿uence the at-
tractiveness of their country as a location for ￿rms supplying intermediate inputs, the
production of which is outsourced by the producers of ￿nal output. This aﬀects the
macroeconomic equilibrium, in particular the wage earned by immobile labor. Thus,
the choice of public infrastructure quality  is a policy instrument for maximizing the
citizen￿s welfare. Welfare is given by national income net of tax payments for public
infrastructure ￿nance, i.e. by15
 
 = 
 +  − 
	 = 	 (13)
  denotes lump-sum taxes which are used for ￿nancing public infrastructure quality
 in country . Due to the symmetry of the two economies with respect to 	 and
,d i ﬀerences in the welfare levels can only arise if wages  and/or lump-sum taxes
are diﬀerent in  and .B o t h  and   depend on the chosen level  of public
infrastructure quality. It is assumed that providing level  requires ! units of ￿nal
output. Formally, the production technology for public infrastructure is given by
! = 
	 = 	.( 14)
!  0 is a cost parameter. The higher !, the more costly it is to provide .S i n c e
is the numØraire good,   = ! gives the tax burden implied by public infrastructure
quality  in country .
It is clear that the optimal infrastructure choice critically depends on the functional
speci￿cation of 
 (•).F o rt h es a k eo fs i m p l i c i t yw ea s s u m et h a t
 (•) is a linear function
15Remember that there is only one consumption good, namely commodity  ,a n dt h a t is capital
income of residents of country .
14in interval [0	 max
 ],g i v e nb y
 ()=Ψ − ,  = 	. (A discussion on the
robustness of our results with respect to this speci￿cation is provided in Section 6.1.)
5.1 The Optimal Level of Public Infrastructure Investment
According to Proposition 3, wage  is an increasing function of public infrastructure
quality . Let for a given level 0 in the partner country   
0 (	 0): = + ,
be the possible levels of gross national income in . Straightforward calculations show
that   
0 is an increasing and strictly convex function of  in interval [0	 max
 [.S i n c e
  is linear in , there are only two candidates for an optimal  decision, namely
 =0and  = max
 . This can be seen in ￿gure 1,w h e r e ,f o rag i v e n,    ()=
  









H H G µ
2
H H G µ
()
2  for  H HH WG µ
()
1  for  H HH WG µ
H G max
H G 0
H WSince ￿xed costs of ￿rms cannot be further reduced by increasing  beyond16 max
 ,
gross income   
0 is independent of  to the right of max
 . However, welfare    ()
declines due to the additional tax burden induced by higher public infrastructure ex-
penditures. The dotted line !1
 indicates a situation with low productivity in public
infrastructure provision. In this case, the welfare maximizing -decision (for a given
level of public infrastructure in country )i sg i v e nb y =0a sc a nb es e e nf r o m
the dotted welfare function    () for !1
. In contrast, if productivity in infrastruc-
ture provision is high, i.e. if ! is low, the welfare maximizing -decision is given by
 = max
 . This case is represented by the solid line !2
 and solid welfare function
   () for !2
.
For any given level of public infrastructure quality 0 in the partner country there
is a threshold ! (0) of the cost of infrastructure provision at which the government
in country  is indiﬀerent between choosing  =0or  = max
 . This cost thresh-
old is given by the condition    (0) =   (max




 	 0) − !max
 .T h u s ,
! (0): =
 (max




where  (	 0) denotes the equilibrium wage in country  when infrastructure
quality is  in country  and 0 in country 0. Obviously, for a given level 0 in
the partner country 0, the optimal choice for country  is  = max
 if ! " ! (0)
and  =0if !  ! (0), respectively. The infrastructure level 0 in the partner
country aﬀects , according to our analysis in Section 4, and thus ! (0), according
to (15). Combining these facts, we obtain the following results concerning the optimal
infrastructure policy of country  in response to a given infrastructure policy of partner
country 0.
Proposition 4 Let 	0 ∈ {	},  6= 0.T h e n :! (0) is decreasing in 0 and
(i) if ! ≤ ! (max
0 ),t h e n = max
 is a dominant strategy; (ii) if ! ≥ ! (0),t h e n
16The remaining ￿xed costs are ￿rm-speci￿c, recall (12).
16 =0is a dominant strategy; (iii) if ! ∈ ]! (max
0 )	! (0)[,t h e n =0is the optimal
response to 0 = max
0 and  = max
 is the optimal response to 0 =0 .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The economic interpretation of Proposition 4 is straightforward. If a country￿s pro-
ductivity in producing public infrastructure quality is high so that infrastructure can be
improved at relatively low cost, then the country should provide top quality regardless of
the situation in the partner country. In contrast, for a country with relatively high cost of
infrastructure provision competitive location policy in form of infrastructure investment
would be counterproductive from a welfare point of view. However, in intermediate cases
- with a less extreme cost structure - optimal policy depends on the other country￿s po-
sition. For countries with intermediate costs of infrastructure our analysis suggests not
to imitate the partner country. To the contrary, top infrastructure provision only pays if
the other country has poor infrastructure quality.
These results are of particular interest in the context of the discussion about core
and periphery economies. They show that public infrastructure investments can explain
core-periphery patterns as politico-economic equilibria17 - with the core country being
characterized by high infrastructure quality, a large number of intermediate input pro-
ducers, low international outsourcing and high productivity of labor (and therefore high
wages), whereas the opposite holds true in the periphery country characterized by low
taxes and a low quality level of public infrastructure. While part (i) and part (ii) of
Proposition 4 indicate that the diﬀerentiation into core and periphery is determined by
diﬀerences in infrastructure costs, part (iii) of the proposition points out that a diﬀeren-
tiation into core and periphery also can result without such diﬀerences. Even in the case
of ex ante perfectly symmetric economies (i.e. 0
 = 0
, Ψ = Ψ, max
 = max
 and
! = !), countries may ex post be diﬀerent with respect to the optimally chosen quality
level of public infrastructure .18
17In Krugman (1991) economies of scale, transport costs and the distribution of demand play an
important role for the existence of a core-periphery structure.
18In this case, there exists a ￿rst-mover advantage for public infrastructure investment.
175.2 Welfare in the : Is There a Need for Policy Coordina-
tion?
From the analysis in Section 4 we know that an infrastructure-induced welfare gain in
country  reduces wages and thus welfare in country  (see Proposition 3). This nega-
tive eﬀect on welfare in country  is not considered by ￿s government when choosing
the optimal level of public infrastructure investment. As a consequence uncoordinated
infrastructure policies may lead to suboptimal -welfare    =    +   .C o n -
sider the case of two symmetric countries. Then, national welfare net of taxes is given by
   =  (	 0) +  − ! ≡   (	 0).T h u s ,t h e p a y - o ﬀ matrix for the two
possible choices of optimal infrastructure policy  =0and  = max
 ≡  is of the
form
 =0  = 
























According to Proposition 4, three cases must be distinguished:














Total welfare resulting in the non-cooperative equilibrium is thus
 










welfare  +   could be increased to   =2   (0	0) by cooperating at  =  =
0.20 This does not mean that policy coordination at  =  =0necessarily increases









20Of course, the ￿nding that zero public infrastructure expenditures are an eﬃcient outcome should
not be taken literally. Rather, the main result is that uncoordinated infrastructure policies can result in
an overinvestment and therefore in a suboptimal level of .
18welfare. For instance, if ! is suﬃciently low,  =  =  is also optimal from the point
of view of -welfare.21
Under high infrastructure cost !, we have (from part (ii) of Proposition 4)















 =2   (0	0) (19)


















" (0	0). Thus, in this case cooperation at  =  =  would de￿nitely




" 2  (0	0).














































.T h u s ,
cooperation at  =  =  cannot improve    but cooperation at  =  =0
may be bene￿cial.
In sum, sometimes though not always policy coordination can improve overall welfare
compared to non-cooperative competitive location policy. In particular, an agreement to
refrain from top infrastructure provision may be bene￿cial if infrastructure costs are high.
Thus, contrary to models with international spillovers uncoordinated competitive policy
may lead to "overtaxation" with regard to taxes that are raised to provide infrastructure
for ￿rms.
21In the case of  =0 , such an outcome is guaranteed. See the discussion in Section 6.3.


























a c c o r d i n gt oP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
19Of course, even if -welfare is maximized by uncoordinated public infrastructure
decisions, there may be a need for (supranational) policy intervention in the form of
redistributional measures. Without such an agreement, potential welfare losses arising
from national competitive location policy may be a barrier to an -formation, in
particular in the case of intermediate costs of infrastructure.24
6 Discussion
The aim of this section is threefold. First, we investigate the robustness of our results
under diﬀerent speci￿cations of 
 (). Second, we present some conclusions on how
infrastructure policies aﬀect wage dispersion in the . Finally, we discuss in how
far our ￿ndings would change if instead of infrastructure investment governments have
a policy instrument which does not require public funding, say the "quality of economic
and social order".
6.1 Diﬀerent Speci￿cations for 	
 ()
Under the linear speci￿cation 
 ()=Ψ −  used in Section 5 there are only two
candidates for an optimal  decision of national governments: The corner solutions
 =0and  = max
 . This outcome critically depends on the convexity of gross
national income   
0 , as a function of ,i ni n t e r v a l[0	 max
 [. Therefore, the relevant
question with respect to the robustness of our results is: In which way is the convexity
of   
0 related to the properties of 
 ()? It is straightforward to show that for any
0	  
0 (	 0) is a convex function of  as long as 
 () is not "too convex"
in interval [0	 max





 ,w h e r e
#, e  are constants determined by technical parameters and labor endowment. Thus,
24In the EU, structural funds at a supranational level help to overcome the infrastructure disadvantages
of several countries and regions. See e.g. Breuss et al. (2001) for details on the agenda 2000￿s structural





































According to (22),   
0 is, for any 0, strictly convex in interval [0	 max
 [,i f
 () is
concave, i.e., if %2
 ()%2
 " 0,o ri fi ti sal i n e a rf u n c t i o na sa s s u m e di nS e c t i o n5 .
If the eﬀect of public infrastructure  on the ￿x e dc o s t sd e s c r i b e db y
 () follows a
suﬃc i e n t l yc o n v e xs h a p e , 
0 is concave in . In this case the corner solutions  =0 ,
 = max
 are still possible candidates for an optimal infrastructure policy if ! is either
very high or very low, respectively. However, for intermediate values of infrastructure
cost ! the optimal infrastructure policy lies in the interior of interval ]0	 max
 [.F i g u r e
2 illustrates, for a given level of , the optimization problem of ￿s government when
  
0 is concave.
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0 and ! represent gross national income and tax costs for infrastructure in-
vestments in country .W e l f a r ei n, represented by   (), reaches a maximum at
∗
 ∈ [0	 max
 [.  =0/  = max
 would be the welfare-maximizing policy if tax costs
were equal or higher than !1
 / equal or lower than !2
 (dotted lines), respectively.
6.2 Public Infrastructure Investment and Wage Dispersion
The impact of diﬀerent policy measures on wage dispersion across economies has always
been an important issue in the literature on international trade. Our analysis provides
insights on how infrastructure policy aﬀects wage dispersion in a .W a g e d i s p e r -
sion is measured by the ratio . We consider a situation where ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed
costs are lower in country  than in country , i.e., 0
 " 0
. This is the source of
wage dispersion in the absence of public infrastructure investment. In all other respects
the two countries are identical. In particular, ! = ! and 
 (•)=Ψ − ,  = 	.
Without public infrastructure wages are higher in country  than in  due to the dif-
ferential in ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed costs. This wage gap increases if both countries improve
public infrastructure quality pari passu.25 The relationship between wage dispersion and
variations in infrastructure quality  =  =  is illustrated in ￿gure 3. The intuition
for this outcome is that the ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed costs disadvantage of country  gets a
higher weight in the wage determination if public infrastructure investment reduces ￿xed
costs 
 .
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0 () have been used and  := 0
 −0
0 denotes the ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed costs diﬀerential
between the two locations. From this we see immediately that   0
if 0. Moreover, in interval




  0 for 0. ¥
22Figure 3: Public infrastructure investment and wage dispersion
Of course, this result does not mean that wage dispersion cannot be reduced through
public infrastructure policies. But countries must coordinate at diﬀerentiated infrastruc-
ture policies. Suppose that the two countries considered above agree that wage dispersion
is of common political concern. Then, lowering the wage dispersion requires policy co-
ordination at  " , which of course may be in con￿ict with the target of overall
-welfare maximization.
6.3 The Quality of Economic and Social Order
So far we have considered only one governmental instrument for a competitive location
policy, namely public infrastructure investment. In the political discussion (especially in
the context of international trade) the quality of economic and social order also plays an
important role. Thereby, the term quality of economic order refers to a country￿s char-
23







1acteristics like market regulation, ￿rm entry and investment rules, workplace protection,
property rights legislation and so on. By social order we refer to respect of human rights,
democratic support of government and other determinants of social stability. Both the
economic and the social order are important factors for the decision on where to set up
a ￿rm. For example, in the absence of any property rights legislation, ￿rms have to bear
substantial (￿xed) investment costs for security systems to protect their property rights.
Social stability has comparable eﬀects. The main diﬀerence to infrastructure investments
is that there is no direct relationship between improvements in the quality of economic
and social order and public funding.26 To make the two policy instruments comparable,
we assume that the relationship between ￿x e dc o s t sa n dt h eq u a l i t yo fe c o n o m i ca n d
social order can again be represented by (12). However, tax costs   do not arise. This
leaves the results in Section 4 unchanged. But choosing quality level max
 is now always
a dominant strategy if   
0 is the objective function of the government.27 This is a direct
consequence of Proposition 3. Since choosing top quality of economic and social order is a
dominant strategy for national governments, our analysis does not indicate supranational
agreements on property rights.
Although evident for national interest, income eﬀects for the  are not a trivial
result due to the negative eﬀects of competitive location policy on the partner country.
However, it can be shown that for any given quality level 0 the -induced gain in
country  outweighs any losses in country 0.I no t h e rw o r d s ,-income is maximized
if both countries choose top quality of economic and social order.28 In sum, there is no
26To the extent that social stability requires redistributional measures with a deadweight loss, we are
back in the previous case with positive costs  of public funding . Obviously, the same applies when
establishment of economic order has costs.
27Due to zero tax costs, 
0 and  coincide.
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24need for policy coordination if the governments aim to improve the quality of economic
and social order. However, redistributional measures may still be relevant in the case of
asymmetric countries.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we set up a model with one ￿nal good and diﬀerentiated intermediate in-
puts that are assembled by the use of immobile labor. We investigate how the location
of intermediate input suppliers, international outsourcing and wages are aﬀected by de-
cisions on public infrastructure investment in two member countries of a .W e￿nd
that national public infrastructure investment, which reduces ￿xed costs for intermediate
input production, raises the number of intermediate input suppliers, reduces international
outsourcing activities of ￿nal goods producers and leads to higher wages in the home coun-
try. The opposite holds in the partner country, where the number of produced varieties
as well as the return to the immobile factor decline, whereas international outsourcing is
stimulated.
In a second step we investigate the role of public infrastructure investment as a com-
petitive location policy of national governments which aim to maximize gross national
income minus (lump-sum) tax payments. Since governments do not take into account the
negative eﬀects on the  partner country, policy coordination may result in a higher
overall -welfare level. Moreover, distributional con￿icts may arise even in ex ante
symmetric countries. Such con￿icts may be an important impediment to a -formation
if no redistributional measures are considered.
With respect to the question of wage dispersion in the ,w e￿nd that wage dis-
persion arising from diﬀerences in ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed costs increases if countries increase
public infrastructure quality pari passu. In other words, the goal to lower wage gaps
across countries requires coordination on diﬀerent infrastructure policies. In a ￿nal step,
Note that e +1=,a c c o r d i n gt ot h ed e ￿nition of . Then,  
  0 directly follows from (9),
(11)a n d 
 
  0.
25we compare public infrastructure investment with variations in the quality of economic
and social order that de￿nes a country￿s attractiveness for intermediate input production
as a function of property rights legislation, social stability and so on. Since changes in
the quality of economic and social order are not directly related to tax costs, improving
this quality is good for both national and -income.
Appendix
Appendix A.1: Derivation of Equilibrium Prices, Quantities and
Firm Numbers
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 − ,( A . 4 )
so that in view of (A.1) the zero-pro￿t condition reduces to

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¢−1 (use again (A.2)).
In an analogous way,

0
0 = '0 − (

	 (A.6)
26with '0 := '
0























(1−) and  6= 0 ∈ {	}.
Next, we derive the equilibrium number of ￿rms. Since ￿rms within countries are











,w i t h 6= 0 ∈ {	}.I n v i e w o f
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−1. An analogous expression holds for 0
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27with  6= 0 ∈ {	}.  =
(1−)








1− have been used. (A.13)
and (A.14) give us (9). ¥
A p p e n d i xA . 2 :P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s1 - 3
In the following derivations, ￿xed costs in country  are given by 1
 and  ∈ [0	 max
 [
holds.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1































































































































































i.e., according to (8), if  ≥ .T h u s ,
(+)
  0 if  () ≤ 1
 and ambiguous
otherwise. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Step 1: Public infrastructure investment and the volume of international outsourcing:

































































Step 2: Public infrastructure investment and the international outsourcing intensity:













































,( A . 18)



































.( A . 19)




































































 " 0 (see step 1), we have





























































































































































  0	 this implies

  0. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
According to (3), wages are given by the equation  =
(1−) 















































  0, according to (8)
and (12), to establish 
  0 and 
 " 0. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Assume 
 ()=Ψ − ,  = 	. Using (8), (12) and (15), we ￿nd for all 0 ∈
[0	 max
















































 with # =( 1− )
1−






fact that there are only two candidates for an optimal infrastructure policy in country ,
namely  =0and  = max
 . Then, straightforward calculations lead from (13), (14)
and (A.24) to Proposition 4. ¥
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